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Abstract
Despite the important role played by GATT in the world economy, economists have not
developed a unified theoretical framework that interprets and evaluates the principles that form
the foundation of GATT. Our purpose here is to propose such a framework. Working within a
general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences with a very general
formulation that includes all the major political-economy models of trade policy as special cases.
Using this general framework we establish three key results. First, GATT's principle of
reciprocity can be viewed as a mechanism for implementing efficient trade agreements. Second,
through the principle of reciprocity countries can implement efficient trade agreements if and only
if they also abide by the principle of nondiscrimination. And third, preferential agreements
undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes through the principle of
reciprocity, unless these agreements take the form of customs unions among partners that are
sufficiently similar.
I. Introduction
The central role played by GATT in shaping post-war trade policy is widely accepted.
Through the eight rounds of trade negotiations that have followed the inception of GATT in 1947,
average ad valorem tariffs on industrial goods have fallen significantly from over 40% to less than
4%. Over the same period of time, membership in GATT (and now its successor organization,
the WTO) has risen from 23 countries to well above 100. Despite the important role played by
GATT in the world economy, however, economists have not developed a unified theoretical
framework that interprets and evaluates the principles that form the foundation of GATT. Our
purpose here is to propose such a framework.
To develop this framework, we must first confront a basic question: What can
governments gain from reciprocal trade agreements such as those negotiated under GATT? We
adopt the view that a trade agreement is appealing to governments if it offers them greater welfare
than they would receive in the absence of the agreement. If in the absence of an agreement
governments set trade policies in a unilateral fashion, then a trade agreement is appealing
provided that an inefficiency (relative to governments' preferences) exists under unilateral tariff
setting. Viewed from this perspective, the role of a trade agreement is then to remove the
inefficiency, so that member governments can enjoy higher welfare. The principles embodied in
the trade agreement can then be interpreted and evaluated in this light.
What, then, is the inefficiency that reciprocal trade agreements are designed to remedy?
We argue that the inefficiency of unilateral trade policies derives from the classic terms-of-trade
externality.1 Intuitively, when a government imposes an import tariff, some of the cost of this
policy is shifted to foreign exporters, whose products sell at a lower world price. This temptation
to shift costs naturally leads governments to set unilateral tariffs that are higher than would be
efficient. A reciprocal trade agreement can then promote a more efficient outcome for its
member governments, if it serves as a means to eliminate the terms-of-trade driven restrictions
in trade volume that arise when policies are set unilaterally.
We develop this conclusion in a very general model. The economic environment is
'For an early formal analysis of the terms-of-trade externality, see Johnson (1953-54), who assumes that
governments maximize national income. More recent discussions include Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Dixit (1987)
and McMillan (1986, 1989).
captured with a standard two-good general equilibrium model of trade between two countries, and
we represent each government's welfare as a general function of the local and world prices that
the tariff selections imply. This formulation enables us to associate a government's motivation
to manipulate the terms of trade with the welfare gain that the government receives when its tariff
choice changes the world price (holding fixed the local price). The government's preferences as
to the local price are unconstrained and may reflect general economic and political (i.e.,
distributional) considerations. Our model thus includes all of the major political-economy models
of trade policy as special cases.
Working with this general framework, we demonstrate that political motivations influence
the determination of the tariff policies to which governments aspire. For example, when
governments have political motivations, free trade may not rest on the efficiency frontier. But
it is the terms-of-trade externality that creates an inefficiency when governments set their trade
policies unilaterally and that therefore explains the appeal of a reciprocal trade agreement.2 To
establish this point conclusively, we demonstrate that unilateral trade policies would be efficient
in a hypothetical world in which governments were not motivated by the terms-of-trade
implications of their trade policies. The associated politically optimal tariffs are efficient,
precisely because the motivation for such tariffs is separate from any cost-shifting incentive.
Armed with this basic conclusion as to the purpose of reciprocal trade agreements, we turn
next to interpret and evaluate the basic principles on which GATT is founded, and we ask
whether GATT's principles can be seen as contributing to this purpose. A first principle is
reciprocity, which is widely recognized as one of the most vital concepts in GATT practice. At
the broadest level, reciprocity refers to the "ideal" of mutual changes in trade policy which bring
about equal changes in import volumes across trading partners. We begin by establishing that
mutual changes in trade policy which conform to reciprocity leave world prices unchanged. We
then look to the specific applications of reciprocity within GATT.
We identify two distinct circumstances under which reciprocity is found in GATT practice.
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 A political motivation for reciprocal trade agreements might arise if governments seek such agreements to gain
commitment relative to their private sectors. This possibility is explored by Maggi and Rodriguez (1996), Staiger
(1995) and Staiger and Tabellini (1987). However, whether this purpose would be served by the basic principles
that form the foundation of GATT is still an open question.
First, reciprocity refers to the balance of concessions (i.e., tariff cuts) that governments seek
through negotiated tariff reductions. While this has been interpreted by many as evidence of a
mercantilist perspective that derives from political forces, we show that it can be given a rather
direct economic interpretation within our framework: governments are driven to choose overly
protective trade policies because of the cost-shifting effects of the world-price movements
associated with their unilateral tariff choices, and would therefore seek lower tariffs if the
world-price implications of their liberalization could be neutralized, a feat that reciprocity
achieves. A second circumstance under which reciprocity is found in GATT practice occurs when
a government decides to increase a previously "bound" (i.e., negotiated) tariff, in which case
GATT's reciprocity rules require moderation on the part of its trading partners, who are permitted
to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions of their own. We show that GATT's insistence
on reciprocity in this circumstance can guide governments to efficient politically optimal
outcomes, since by neutralizing the world-price effects of a government's decision to raise tariffs,
reciprocity eliminates the externality that causes governments to make inefficient trade policy
choices.
We then turn to the principle of non-discrimination (MFN) which, along with reciprocity,
provides the second pillar of the foundation upon which GATT is built. We extend our
framework to a multi-country setting within which we can interpret and evaluate the principle of
non-discrimination. We first establish an "affinity" between politically optimal tariffs and the
principle of non-discrimination: we show that politically optimal tariffs are efficient if and only
if they conform to MFN. Intuitively, we have argued above that politically optimal tariffs are
efficient provided that the externalities imposed by each country's tariff choices travel through
world prices. In a multi-country world, externalities indeed travel in this way when tariffs
conform to MFN, and hence politically optimal tariffs that conform to MFN are efficient. On the
other hand, tariff discrimination complicates the transmission of externalities across trading
partners, by allowing bilateral trade volumes (and hence the local prices in each country) to
transmit externalities as well, and as a consequence, politically optimal tariffs are no longer
efficient when tariff discrimination is present.
When we explore the implications of reciprocity in our multi-country setting, we find that
an efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity if and only if it
is characterized by politically optimal tariffs which conform to the principle of MFN. Intuitively,
in a multi-country world, the principle of reciprocity still has the effect of neutralizing the
world-price effects of a government's decision to raise tariffs, and so it can eliminate the
externality that causes governments to make inefficient trade policy choices provided again that
trade policy externalities travel only through world prices. When governments abide by the
principle of MFN, externalities indeed travel in this way, and so reciprocity and
non-discrimination work in complementary fashion as principles that guide governments to
efficient multilateral trade agreements.
Finally, with the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination interpreted and evaluated,
we consider the implications of a major exception to the principle of non-discrimination that must
be granted whenever GATT's member governments negotiate preferential agreements. This
exception, embodied in Article XXIV of GATT, was controversial in its inception and has met
with renewed controversy recently as many GATT members have increasingly exercised their
rights under this article to negotiate preferential agreements. We use our framework to address
a central question in this controversy: Will preferential agreements interfere with a multilateral
trading system that is built upon the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination?
In accord with Article XXIV, we consider two forms of preferential agreements '.free trade
agreements, in which the member countries eliminate barriers to trade, and customs unions, in
which the members adopt a common external tariff policy as well. We find that free trade
agreements are fundamentally at odds with a multilateral trading system that is build on the pillars
of reciprocity and non-discrimination. This is simply because, to deliver efficiency, reciprocity
requires a world in which the transmission of trade policy externalities is contained within world
price movements, but externalities travel through local prices as well when tariffs are
discriminatory (as when some countries form a free trade area). Consequently, reciprocity can
not deliver an efficient multilateral agreement in the presence of free trade areas. On the other
hand, we find that reciprocity can continue to deliver efficient outcomes in the presence of a
customs union, provided that the members of the union have sufficiently similar political
objectives and that all external tariffs continue to be set in conformity with MFN. Our results
therefore suggest rather narrow circumstances under which reciprocity can deliver an efficient
multilateral trade agreement in the presence of preferential agreements. As such, we offer support
for the view that preferential agreements pose a threat to the existing multilateral system.
This paper builds on the approach from Bagwell and Staiger (1996) in which we study
the purpose of reciprocal trade agreements but do not interpret and evaluate the principles of
reciprocity and non-discrimination as embodied in GATT practice. A more closely related paper
is Bagwell and Staiger (1997), where we adopt a partial equilibrium framework, impose a
particular representation of political economy, and explore similar themes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents our basic framework
in a two-country setting and explores the purpose of reciprocal trade agreements. Section III then
turns to an interpretation and evaluation of the principle of reciprocity. A multi-country extension
of our framework is developed in Section IV, and the principle of non-discrimination is examined.
Preferential agreements are considered in Section V, while Section VI concludes and offers a
discussion of empirical evidence related to the central tenets of our approach.
II. The Purpose of Reciprocal Trade Agreements
In this section we develop our basic framework in a two-country setting. We use this
framework to derive and interpret the source of the inefficiency associated with unilateral tariff
choices, and we show that a trade agreement will exhaust the possibilities of further mutual gains
for its member-governments if it succeeds in eliminating the terms-of-trade motivations from their
trade policy choices. These results will provide the starting point for our analysis of reciprocity
in Section III, and their multi-country analogue will provide the basis of our exploration of non-
discrimination and preferential agreements contained in sections IV and V, respectively.
A. The Economic Environment
We work within a standard two-sector, two-country perfectly-competitive general-
equilibrium trade model. Two countries, home (no *) and foreign (*), trade two goods, x and y,
taken to be normal goods in consumption and produced under conditions of increasing opportunity
costs. Production takes place under perfect competition, facing tariffs on imports by each country.
Let x (y) be the natural import good of the home (foreign) country, and define p=px/py to be
the local relative price facing home producers and consumers, with p*=Px/Py the local relative
price facing foreign producers and consumers. With t (t*) representing the home (foreign) ad
valorem import tariff which we take to be non-prohibitive, and with T = (1 +1) and T * = (1 +1 *) ,
we have p=xpw=p{x,pw) and p*=pw/x*=p* (x*,pw) , where pw=p^/py is the "world"
(untaxed) relative price. The foreign (domestic) terms of trade are then measured by pw (1/p™).
We interpret T>1 (T<1) to be an import tax (import subsidy), and similarly for x* ?
Production in each country is determined by selecting the point on its production
possibilities frontier at which the marginal rate of transformation between x and y is equal to the
local relative price: Q±=Qi (p) and Q±=Ql (p*) for i={x,y}. Consumption will be a function
of the local relative price ~ which defines the tradeoff faced by consumers and determines the
level and distribution of factor income in the economy ~ and of tariff revenue R (R*), which is
distributed lump-sum to domestic (foreign) consumers and which we measure in units of the local
export good at local prices. We represent domestic and foreign consumption, respectively, as
D1=Di{p,R) and D*=D* (p* ,R*) for i={x,y}. Tariff revenue is defined implicitly by
R= [Dx(p, R) -Qx(p) ] x [p-p w] or R=Rip,pw) for the domestic country, and similarly by
R*=[D*(p*fR*)-Qy(p*)]x[l/p*-l/pw] or R*=R*(p*,pw) for the foreign country,
with each country's tariff revenue an increasing function of its terms of trade under the
assumption that goods are normal. National consumption in each country can thus be written as
C^p.p^^D^p.R^p.p")) and Cl{p*,pw)=D*{p*,R*{p*,pw)) .
Home-country imports of x, Mx (p (x , p w) ,pw) , are then given by the difference between
home-country consumption and production of x, while home-country exports of y,
Ey (p ( T / P w) / P w) , are given by the difference between home-country production and
consumption of y. Foreign country imports of y, M* (p * (x *, p w) , p w) , and exports of x,
Ex (p* (x*,pw) ,pw) , are similarly defined. Home and foreign budget constraints imply that,
for any world price, we have
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 The Lerner symmetry theorem ensures that trade taxes or subsidies can be equivalently depicted as applying
to exports or to imports in this two-sector general equilibrium setting.
p wMx(p(x,p ™),p *) = Ey(p{^p "),/> "); My*(p *(X \p > ^ ) =p w £ > *(T \p
Finally, the equilibrium world price pw ( T , T *) is determined by the y-market-clearing condition
with equilibrium in the x-market then assured by (1).
B. Government Objectives
In order to keep our results general, we place a minimal amount of structure on the
representation of government preferences. We assume that each government has the sovereign
right to define its own domestic objectives and to utilize trade policy in pursuit of those
objectives. We allow that a government might be interested in the pursuit of national income
goals, but we allow as well that it might be concerned with the distribution of national income
across the population. Such distributional considerations could reflect a broad societal desire to
help certain segments of the population, or they may arise from a political desire to help special
interests. In either case, distributional concerns generate government preferences over local prices
which reflect more than simply the implications of these prices for national income.
Accordingly, we represent the objectives of the home and foreign governments by the
g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n s W{p{x , p w { % , x * ) ) , p w ( x f x * ) ) a n d W* (p* { x * , p w ( x , x * ) ) , p w ( x , x * ) ) ,
respectively. The primary structure we place on W and W* is that, holding local prices fixed,
each government is assumed to achieve higher welfare with a terms-of-trade improvement:
dWfap^/dp™ < 0; dW*(p\pw)/6pw > 0. <3>
With local prices held fixed, an improvement in a country's terms-of-trade amounts to a direct
income transfer from its trading partner. We also assume that the second-order conditions
associated with the maximization problems developed below are globally satisfied.
We note that our representation of government objectives is indeed quite general, as in
each of the leading models of political economy and trade policy governments set trade policy
as if they were maximizing a function of this form. For example, in a representative democracy,
the government may set trade policy to serve the interests of the median voter (Mayer, 1984),
whose utility can be represented by a function of this form. Alternatively, as Baldwin (1987)
observes, the major approaches to political economy of trade policy represented by Olson (1965),
Caves (1976), Brock and Magee (1978), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Feenstra and Bhagwati
(1982) and Hillman (1982) can all be represented in this way. Finally, the recent lobbying
models of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) also fit within our framework.
We also note that this representation of government preferences can be modified to allow
for the possibility, as discussed by Baldwin (1985), that a government is motivated by
autonomous ideological concerns that shape its goals but faces a political-support constraint in
setting trade policy to pursue these goals. For example, the home government might be a "free-
trader," but its ability to implement free trade policies may be hindered by the need to mobilize
export support to offset political opposition to its liberalization efforts from import-competing
sectors. Letting G represent the objectives of the domestic government, we can represent the
government's domestic political-support constraint by the inequality restriction
S(p(x ,pw(x
 fx*) ) , P " ( T , T * ) ) >5. Forming the Lagrangian, W, would then define the
domestic government's constrained maximization problem, with p the Lagrange multiplier:4
Hence, the problem faced by a liberalizing government that must mobilize export support for its
liberalization efforts can be represented as the problem of choosing tariffs to maximize a function
of the general form that we consider.
C. The Purpose of Reciprocal Trade Agreements
We assume that governments seek reciprocal trade agreements to achieve mutually
beneficial changes in trade policy while respecting the sovereign right of each government to
define its national goals. That is, through a reciprocal trade agreement governments seek tariff
changes that result in Pareto improvements for member countries (as measured by W and W*)
4While p is a choice variable, its optimal value will be a function of p and pw as well.
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over what could be achieved by unilateral tariff setting. Reciprocal trade liberalization then refers
to mutual reductions in tariffs implemented through a reciprocal trade agreement. An efficient
reciprocal trade agreement will reach the efficiency locus, defined by
[dx/dx*] | ^ . , 0 . CO
Observe that the efficiency locus is defined with reference to the governments' welfare functions,
W and W*, which may embody both national income and political considerations.
We begin our exploration of reciprocal trade agreements by considering the trade policy
inefficiencies that arise in their absence. To this end, we first suppose that each government sets
its trade policy unilaterally, selecting a tariff to maximize its objective function taking the tariff
choice of its trading partner as given. The home and foreign reaction functions, respectively, are
defined implicitly by
Home: Wp[dp/dx] + WpW[dpw/dx]=0; Foreign: W\[dp*/dx*] + W\[dpw/dx*]=0 (5)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Under standard conditions ruling out the Metzler and
Lerner paradoxes, we have dp/ dx > 0, dp * / dx * < 0, dp w/ dx < 0 and dp w/dx * > 0 . Thus, with
X=[dpw/dx] / [dp/dx] < 0 and X*= [dpw/dx*] / [dp * / dx*} < 0, (5) can be rewritten as
Home: Wp + XWpW = 0, (6a)
Foreign: Wp\ + VW*W = 0. (6b)
Each government's best-response tariff is therefore determined by the combined impact that the
induced local and world price movements have on welfare.
Figure 1 offers a general interpretation of the two forces that combine to determine trade
policy when governments set tariffs non-cooperatively in a Nash equilibrium: the impact of trade
intervention on local prices and the impact of trade intervention on the terms of trade. Consider
an initial tariff pair represented by the point A= (x, x *) in Figure 1. Corresponding to this tariff
pair will be a domestic iso-local-price locus, denoted as p (A) ^p {A) , and an iso-world-price
locus, given as p W(A) - p W(A) .5 Now consider a unilateral tariff increase by the domestic
government. For a fixed T*, an increase in x to x1 will induce a new point C= {x1, x*) . This
point lies on new iso-price loci, depicted in Figure 1 as p (C) - p (C) and pw(C) ^pw(C) , and
the domestic government experiences a local price that is now higher and a world price that is
now lower than those at the original point A.
As (6a) suggests, the overall movement from A to C induced by a unilateral tariff increase
by the domestic government can be disentangled into separate movements in the local and world
prices, respectively. The movement from A to B isolates the world price change, and the
corresponding welfare effect for the domestic government is associated in (6a) with the term
XWpW which, by (3), is strictly positive. Similarly, the movement from B to C reflects the
induced increase in the local price, holding fixed the world price, and the welfare implications
of this change for the domestic government are associated in (6a) with the term Wp. The world-
price movement from A to B illustrates the cost-shifting that arises when trade policies are set
unilaterally. If the domestic government seeks to implement a local price corresponding to the
iso-local-price locus p(C) ^p{C) , then a unilateral increase in the domestic import tariff passes
some of the costs of this outcome to the foreign government, whose exports are sold at a lower
world price. A similar decomposition holds for (6b). Hence, as (6a) and (6b) indicate, the terms-
of-trade effects of intervention ensure that neither government will face the full cost of catering
to its import-competing interests. Finally, Nash equilibrium tariffs are a pair of domestic and
foreign tariffs (xN,x*N ) which simultaneously satisfy (6a) and (6b).6
The inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium is now immediate, and we record it in:
5The iso-local-price locus (iso-terms-of-trade locus) will have negative (positive) slope in the absence of the
Metzler and Lerner paradoxes.
6We postpone for now the issues of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, returning to these issues later
in the section. We focus for now on statements that will be true of any Nash equilibrium with positive trade that
is not Pareto dominated by other Nash equilibria. An implication of this focus is that we ignore here and throughout
the paper the possible gains from a reciprocal trade agreement that could come from coordinating across Pareto
ranked Nash equilibria. The lack of enforcement issues associated with pure coordination gains and the prominence
of enforcement issues in actual trade agreements suggests that pure coordination is not the primary objective of
reciprocal trade agreements in practice. Similarly, we ignore for now the issue of existence and uniqueness of
politically optimal and efficient tariffs, as defined below; these issues are also addressed later in the section.
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Proposition 1: Nash equilibrium tariffs are inefficient.
Proof: We begin by noting that
dx , __dpw/dx* *Wp+WpW dx • _ dp*/dx* {WP*+VWPW} (7)
dx* ldw=°~~ dp/dx VWp+XWpJ' dx* ]dW*=°~~ dpldx W'JT'+W
y y
 p*i pw
At a pair of Nash equilibrium tariffs (xN, x *N) , [ dx / dx * ] |
 dw=Q =«>> 0 = [ dx / dx * ] | dw*=0 by (6a),
(6b), and (7). Thus, by (4), the tariff pair (xN, x*N) is inefficient. QED
Proposition 1 implies that Pareto improvements from the Nash equilibrium could be
achieved through an appropriate reciprocal trade agreement. Next we characterize the nature of
reciprocal trade agreements.
Proposition 2: A reciprocal trade agreement must entail reciprocal trade liberalization.
Proof: We wish to establish that a necessary condition for a tariff pair (x°,x*°) to yield welfare
improvements for both the domestic and foreign government relative to the Nash tariffs (TN,T*N)
is that T°<TN and T*°<T*N. TO establish this we suppose that -C°>T:N and show that the foreign
government must loose. The other case in which T*°>T*N can be handled in an analogous way.
First consider the impact of each country's tariff change on the welfare of its trading
partner, given by dW/dx*=[xWp+WpW] [dpw/dx*] and dW*/dx=[W**/x* + W*w] [dpw/dx] ,
respectively. Recalling that (6a) and (6b) define, respectively, the domestic and foreign reaction
functions TR(T*) and T*R(T), we note that when the domestic or foreign government, respectively,
is on its reaction function, the impact on its welfare of a rise in its trading partner's tariff is
dW/dx* = [l-xR(x*)\]WpW[dpw/dx*] < 0; dW*/dx = [l-X*/x*R(x)]W*w[dpw/dx] < 0.
These inequalities imply that, along each government's reaction function, its welfare is strictly
declining in the tariff of its trading partner. With this we now have that T°>TN implies
11
V * V)))
< W*(p *(T * V V " ( T V * V)))* V V * V))) = JT fo *(T ' V(T",T *")),/^ V *"))•
Thus, the foreign government must be hurt by any change in tariffs that involves increasing the
domestic tariff from its Nash level. Exactly analogous arguments establish that the domestic
government must be hurt by any change in tariffs that involves increasing the foreign tariff from
its Nash level. Hence, a necessary condition for tariff changes from the Nash equilibrium to
improve a government's welfare is that its trading partner liberalize, and consequently a reciprocal
trade agreement must entail reciprocal trade liberalization. QED
We have shown that the Nash equilibrium is inefficient and that a reciprocal trade
agreement must lead to reciprocal trade liberalization. Reciprocal trade liberalization is therefore
attractive to governments regardless of their political inclination, and indeed, whether governments
act as national income maximizers, as maximizers of a broader notion of social welfare which
includes distributional concerns, or as agents for politically powerful interest groups. This result
reflects a simple and general intuition. When a government imposes an import tariff, its terms
of trade improve, and part of the cost of this distortionary policy is borne by its trading partners,
whose producers sell at a lower price. This terms-of-trade externality implies that the government
faces less than the full cost of protecting its import-competing sectors. As a consequence,
governments tend to oversupply policies directed toward import protection relative to the efficient
intervention levels given their objectives.7 A reciprocal trade agreement can therefore benefit all
governments, if it serves as a mechanism through which the associated terms-of-trade driven
restrictions can be reduced.
We next show that the efficiency locus can be reached by eliminating the terms-of-trade
motivations from each government's Nash trade policy decisions and implementing tariffs which
jointly satisfy
Similarly, when a government stimulates its export sector with an export subsidy, its terms of trade deteriorate,
and so consumers abroad receive some of the benefit of the subsidy. The government thus faces exaggerated costs
of stimulating the export sectors, and governments thus tend to undersupply policies directed toward export
promotions relative to the efficient level.
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Home: Wn = 0, (8a)p
Foreign: W** = 0. (8b)
We define politically optimal tariffs as any tariff pair (xP0, x*P0) satisfying (8a) and (8b). In
the special case where the domestic and foreign governments seek to maximize national income,
politically optimal tariffs will correspond with reciprocal free trade.8 More generally, however,
if governments care as well for the distribution of national income when making trade policy
decisions, politically optimal tariffs will diverge from reciprocal free trade.
The efficiency properties of politically optimal tariffs are now immediate:
Proposition 3: Politically optimal tariffs are efficient.
Proof: Using (7), we have [dz/dx*] \dw=0 = - [dpw/d^] / [dpw/dx] = [di /dx*] \dw.__0 at
politically optimal tariffs defined by (8a) and (8b), which therefore by (4) are efficient. QED
Hence, if governments can negotiate a trade agreement that eliminates the terms-of-trade
motivations from their trade-policy decisions, no further adjustments in trade policy can yield
mutual gains. To understand this conclusion, suppose that all terms-of-trade considerations have
been eliminated from the tariff choices of each government. Then each government has set its
trade policy to achieve its preferred local prices without concern for the terms-of-trade
implications of its intervention. Now consider a small change in the level of a country's
intervention. Such a change will have three effects: (i) It will induce a small change in the
country's local prices; (ii) it will induce a small change in the terms of trade; and (iii) through
movement in the terms of trade, it will induce a small change in the local prices of its trading
partners. But effects (i) and (iii) can not offer gains to governments, as they have already set
8In particular, when both the domestic and foreign governments maximize the utility of a representative agent,
their objectives can be represented as W{p,pw) = V{p,I{p,pw) ) and W* (p*,p w) =V* {p*, I* (p*,p w) ) ,
respectively, with V (V*) representing the indirect utility function of the representative domestic (foreign) agent,
and with I (I *) denoting domestic (foreign) national income measured in units of good y at local prices. Using
Roy's Identity, it is then direct to compute that Wp=0=W*p. implies X=0=T*.
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their policies to achieve preferred local prices, while the terms-of-trade movement in (ii)
represents a pure international transfer. Thus, once terms-of-trade considerations have been
eliminated from the tariff choices of member governments, no further Pareto gains are possible.
More generally, Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the essential inefficiency associated with
non-cooperative tariffs and why politically optimal tariffs will be efficient. If the domestic
government wishes to implement a local price that corresponds to the iso-local-price locus
p(C) -+p(C) , then attaining this price imposes no world-price externality when the higher import
tariff of the domestic government is balanced against a higher import tariff by its trading partner,
so that the world price is not altered. This corresponds in Figure 1 with the movement from A
to D. If the domestic government were not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications of its
tariff policy, it would prefer choosing a higher tariff and inducing point C instead of selecting a
lower tariff and inducing point A if and only if it also prefers point D to point A. If both
governments were to choose tariffs in this fashion, then a resulting consistent set of tariffs is
politically optimal. In this case, the tariffs that governments select are not influenced by cost-
shifting motives, and so politically optimal tariffs are efficient.9
On the other hand, when the domestic government chooses its tariff policy mindful of the
terms-of-trade externality associated with movements in the world price (i.e., the movement from
D to C), it is aware that some of the costs of achieving the higher domestic local price will be
transferred abroad through the resulting reduction in the world price. For this reason, the
domestic government will choose a higher tariff (i.e., restrict trade more) than is jointly efficient.
This explains why Nash trade policies are inefficient, with trade volumes that are too low.
Of course, implementing politically optimal tariffs is only one way to achieve an efficient
trade agreement. To see this, we use (4) and (7) to recast the efficiency locus in the form
where A={l-xX) / {W+XwnV) and A* = (l-X*/x*) / (W*+VW*) ,withA*0 andA**0 under
9A willingness to move from point A to D in Figure 1 induces no externality through the terms of trade, but it
will cause a change in the foreign local price. However, if the foreign government also selects tariffs that are
politically optimal, then a small change in the foreign local price will have no first-order effect on foreign welfare.
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the further assumption that the partial derivatives for the welfare functions are always finite. As
(9) can be satisfied even if Wp*0 and W***0, efficiency need not imply that tariffs are politically
optimal. Rather, political optimality defines a point on the efficiency locus where each
government achieves the welfare level it would receive in a hypothetical world in which neither
government distorts its tariff choices in light of its ability to shift the costs of its intervention onto
its trading partner. Reaching other points on the efficiency locus will require altering tariffs from
their politically optimal levels in such a way as to change the international distribution of income
through world price movements while generating a set of local prices that is efficient in light of
the new distribution of national income across countries.10
We now add some additional structure to the model and assume that (i). a unique Nash
equilibrium exists, (ii). a unique political optimum exists, and (iii). the political optimum lies on
the contract curve (i.e., it corresponds to a point on the efficiency locus that yields mutual gains
for each government relative to its Nash welfare).11 These assumptions are imposed in Figure 2,
which illustrates the three propositions of the section. As Proposition 1 indicates, the Nash tariffs
(point N) lie off of the efficiency locus as defined by (9) (the curve E->E). The figure also
depicts the Nash iso-welfare curves for the domestic and foreign governments, and these curves
illustrate the message of Proposition 2: relative to the Nash equilibrium, a trade agreement can
increase the welfare of both governments only if the agreement calls for a reduction in both
tariffs. Finally, as Proposition 3 requires, the politically optimal tariffs (point PO) lie on the
efficiency locus. Notice that the iso-welfare curves are tangent at every point along this locus,
including the politically optimal point. A novel feature of the politically optimal point is that the
iso-welfare curves are also tangent to the iso-world-price line. The bold portion of the efficiency
10For example, in the special case of national-income-maximizing governments, we have seen that the political
optimum will be reciprocal free trade, but it is well known (see, for example, Mayer, 1981) that an entire locus of
efficient tariffs can be obtained by choosing an import tax for one country and a symmetric import subsidy for the
other so as to keep local prices in each country equalized while generating different international income distributions
through the associated changes in world prices.
1
'Existence and uniqueness of Nash and politically optimal tariffs follow from standard stability conditions on
the relevant functions. The location of the political optimum on the portion of the efficiency locus corresponding
to the contract curve follows from sufficient symmetry across countries. As Kennan and Riezman (1988) show for
the case in which welfare is given by national income, when governments are sufficiently asymmetric, the political
optimum (which is then free trade) need not offer Pareto gains relative to the Nash equilibrium for all governments.
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locus corresponds to the contract curve.
More broadly, Figure 2 clarifies the basic task facing governments that seek to design a
reciprocal trade agreement. In the absence of any attempt at cooperation, governments would set
trade policies unilaterally, leading to the Nash outcome N. This outcome is inefficient from the
governments' perspectives, however, because of the cost-shifting aspect of trade policy that is
associated with the terms-of-trade externality. A reciprocal trade agreement is then appealing to
governments as a means to cooperate and move tariffs from the inefficient Nash point to some
alternative tariff pair on the contract curve. A focal tariff pair on the contract curve corresponds
to the politically optimal tariffs. These tariffs remedy the Nash inefficiency in a very direct way,
as they are the tariffs that governments would choose in a unilateral setting if they were not
motivated by terms-of-trade implications of their trade policies. As Figure 2 illustrates, when
governments have both political and economic objectives, the efficiency locus need not pass
through the reciprocal free trade point. With regard to the role of "politics" and "economics" in
reciprocal trade agreements, we may thus offer the following distinction: while governments'
political concerns will affect their preferences over tariffs (e.g., the location of the efficiency
locus), it is the terms-of-trade externality that creates an inefficiency when governments set their
trade policies unilaterally and that therefore explains the appeal of a reciprocal trade agreement.
When seeking a reciprocal trade agreement, governments therefore require a negotiation
approach that serves to move tariffs from the inefficient Nash point to the contract curve. There
are two basic approaches that might be considered. In a "rules-based" approach, governments
identify and agree upon certain principles under which subsequent negotiations will be undertaken
to eliminate the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade and promote an efficient outcome on
the contract curve. On the other hand, governments might also consider a "power-based"
approach in which they bargain in a direct fashion that is not constrained by agreed-upon
principles of negotiation. The rules-based approach may lead to a point on the contract curve
which differs from that implemented under a power-based approach, as in the latter the relative
"bargaining power" of the negotiating governments then comes into play. As our focus is on the
negotiation rules that are embodied in GATT, we examine here the extent to which the rules of
reciprocity and non-discrimination assist governments as they navigate their way from the Nash
point to the contract curve.
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III. Reciprocity
The principle of reciprocity is widely recognized as one of the most vital concepts in
GATT practice. In this section, we define and interpret this principle. We find that GATT's
principle of reciprocity can guide governments to the contract curve, and in particular that
reciprocity can deliver the political optimum.
A. The Principle of Reciprocity
We begin with the obvious first question: What is reciprocity? At the broadest level,
reciprocity refers to the "ideal" of mutual changes in trade policy which bring about equal changes
in import volumes across trading partners.12 More formally, and in the context of the two-country
model developed in the previous section, we will say that a set of tariff changes AT = ( T 1 - ! 0 )
and A T * = ( T + 1 - I : * 0 ) conforms to reciprocity provided that
where pw0=pw(x° ,x*°) , pwl=pw(x1,x*1) , and where we have without loss of generality
measured changes in import volumes at existing world prices. Using the trade balance condition
(1) and the equilibrium condition (2), it is direct to show that this expression reduces to
Hence, mutual changes in trade policy that conform to reciprocity will leave world prices
unchanged. This is a promising beginning, since as demonstrated in the last section a government
sets its tariffs in an inefficient manner if and only if its tariff choice imparts an externality to the
welfare of trading partners through a change in the world price.
With the general principle of reciprocity now defined, we consider next the application of
this principle within GATT practice. We distinguish between two applications. First, the
principle of reciprocity is often interpreted in terms of the informal idea that governments seek
a "balance of concessions" (i.e., reciprocal tariff cuts) when they enter into trade negotiations.
12See, for example, Dam (1970, pp. 58-61 and pp. 87-91) on the concept of reciprocity in GATT and for a
discussion of the various ways in which reciprocity is actually measured in practice.
17
The emphasis that governments place upon reciprocity in this sense has attracted the interest of
many economists, and we therefore pause and offer an economic interpretation of this application
of reciprocity in the next subsection. A second application of the principle of reciprocity can be
found within the formal rules of GATT itself. We give this application primary emphasis, and
it concerns the rules by which GATT members must abide when they renegotiate agreements.
In the final subsection, we interpret and evaluate the agreements that governments can implement
when they recognize that the principle of reciprocity governs any renegotiation process.
B. Reciprocity and the Balance of Concessions
As mentioned above, a first application of the concept of reciprocity in GATT practice
reflects the balance of concessions that governments seek through a negotiated agreement. As
Dam (1970, p. 59) explains, the language of Article XXVIII bis, under which the rounds of
GATT tariff negotiations occur, makes it clear that participation in these negotiations is to be
voluntary, and that negotiations are to be carried out "on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous
basis." Dam continues:
"This permissive approach to the content of tariff agreements is often referred to under the heading of reciprocity.
From the formal legal principle that a country need make concessions only when other contracting parties offer
reciprocal concessions considered to be "mutually advantageous" has been derived the informal principle that
exchanges of concessions must entail reciprocity." (Dam, 1970, p. 59)
This informal principle of reciprocity, which Bhagwati (1991) calls "first-difference"
reciprocity, appears to defy standard economic logic, which holds that unilateral free trade is the
optimal policy for a country. Why should a government require a "concession" from its trading
partner in order to do what is in any event best for its country? Indeed, the observation that
governments seek reciprocity in negotiated agreements is sometimes interpreted as evidence that
government negotiators adopt a mercantilist perspective that is inconsistent with economic
reasoning and derives from political forces. For example, Krugman (1991, p. 25) observes:
"To make sense of international trade negotiations, one needs to remember three simple rules about the
objectives of the negotiating countries:
1) Exports are good.
2) Imports are bad.
3) Other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good.
In other words, GATT-think is enlightened mercantilism." (Krugman, 1991, p. 25)
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The question we now address is, can the mercantilist approach to reciprocal trade liberalization
that seems to drive actual negotiations be explained within our framework?13
In fact, this informal principle of reciprocity admits a rather direct interpretation within
our framework. To develop this argument, we assume for the moment that governments begin at
the Nash equilibrium point, and we show that reciprocal trade liberalization that satisfies the
principle of reciprocity increases the welfare of each government in a monotonic fashion, at least
if the liberalization effort does not proceed too far:
Proposition 4: Beginning at a Nash tariff equilibrium, reciprocal trade liberalization that leaves
world prices unchanged will increase each government's welfare monotonically until this
liberalization has proceeded to the point where min [-WpfW*.] =0. If countries are symmetric,
this liberalization path leads to the efficient politically optimal outcome.
Proof: Consider reciprocal reductions in x and x* beginning from the Nash equilibrium and
moving along the positively-sloped iso-world-price locus that passes through (TN,T*N). With
dpw=0, the impact of a small amount of reciprocal liberalization along this path on domestic
government welfare W is just -Wp {dp/dx) dx while the impact on foreign government welfare
W* is -W* {dp*/dx*) dx*. Both are strictly positive around the Nash equilibrium, and both
continue to be strictly positive until liberalization has proceeded down this path to the point where
min [-Wpt W*.] =0. If countries are symmetric, then both Wp and Wp, will reach zero at the
same point on the iso-world-price locus through (TN, T*N), defining a pair of politically optimal
tariffs by (8a) and (8b). QED
Propositions 1 through 4 provide a formal economic interpretation of the apparent
"mercantilist" behavior that seems to characterize actual trade negotiations, and of the emphasis
on a "balance of concessions" that arises therein. Consistent with Krugman's (1991) three rules
of "enlightened mercantilism," we find that: (1). Governments enter into negotiations seeking
more open export markets ("exports are good"), because a reduction in the import tariff levied by
the trading partner serves to improve the terms of trade; (2). Import liberalization is viewed by
I3Krugman (1997) develops more fully the view that GATT negotiations are incompatible with economic
reasoning and reflect mercantilist logic. Some of the advantages of reciprocity described by Bhagwati (1991, pp.
50-51) are more in line with the results we establish here.
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governments as a concession ("imports are bad"), because it implies reducing the import tariff
below the best-response value and suffering a terms-of-trade decline; and (3). Each government
benefits from a concession at home that is balanced under reciprocity against an "equivalent"
concession abroad ("other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good"),
because the balance of concessions so achieved serves to neutralize the terms-of-trade decline that
would have made unilateral liberalization undesirable.
It is interesting to contrast this explanation of why governments seek reciprocity with a
specific political-economy argument that is often expressed. In particular, it is frequently argued
that the appeal of reciprocity is that the reduction in the foreign import tariff mobilizes political
support among domestic exporters that serves as a counterweight against the objections to
liberalization voiced by the domestic import-competing sector. While we are unaware of any
formal treatment of this argument, it is clear that the proposed export-sector support for
reciprocity must spring from the anticipated economic consequence of the reduced foreign import
tariff for this sector. The economic consequence of this tariff reduction for the export sector,
however, travels through the world price. As such, this political perspective of reciprocity also
can be captured within our modeling framework.
C. Reciprocity and the Withdrawal of Substantially Equivalent Concessions
As is evident from Dam's discussion, there is nothing in GATT which requires that the
outcome of negotiations produce a balance of concessions. Instead, reciprocity in this
circumstance describes the broad manner in which governments seem to approach trade
negotiations. As mentioned, however, there is also a second circumstance under which the
concept of reciprocity plays an important role in GATT, and here GATT does require that
countries comply with the rule of reciprocity. This second circumstance applies to renegotiation,
and occurs when (i). a country proposes to modify or withdraw a tariff concession to which it had
previously committed in a round of tariff negotiation, which it is essentially free to do at any time
(GATT Article XXVIII; Dam, 1970, pp. 79-99; Jackson, 1989, p. 119), and (ii). it fails to reach
agreement with its trading partners over a renegotiated tariff schedule. In this circumstance, the
country is free to carry out the proposed changes anyway, and the notion of reciprocity is used
to moderate the responses of its trading partners, who are permitted to withdraw substantially
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equivalent concessions of their own.
By requiring moderation on the part of trading partners, this second application of
reciprocity ensures that the proposing country's unilateral decision to increase a previously bound
tariff must result in an outcome which preserves the original world price. Consequently, under
GATT's rules, any agreement that leaves some government wanting less trade at the prevailing
world price will be renegotiated. For the remainder of the paper, we will focus on reciprocity as
it applies in this second circumstance, and we will consider the kinds of trade agreements that can
be implemented in its presence. In particular, we explore the nature of trade agreements that can
be implemented when governments negotiate an initial set of tariff "bindings" from an initial
disagreement point corresponding to Nash welfare levels, where subsequently either government
is free at any time to increase its previously bound tariff with the understanding that the outcome
of any renegotiation that follows will preserve the world price implied by the previous agreement.
We wish to characterize the set of trade agreements that can be implemented as the end result of
this process, i.e., once no further renegotiation is desired by either government.
We thus focus our attention on a negotiation structure that entails an initial negotiation
stage (corresponding to Article XXVIII bis), in which governments agree to bind their tariffs at
specified levels, followed by a second stage (corresponding to Article XXVIII) in which a round
of renegotiation is possible subject to the restriction of reciprocity as outlined above. In light of
the ability to renegotiate, it is apparent that, when governments negotiate the initial tariff bindings,
they are really negotiating a world price upon which, in the event that either government wishes
subsequently to raise its tariff and reduce the volume of its imports at this world price, the
reciprocal tariff increase by its trading partner will be gauged. Finally, to ensure that the
renegotiation process achieves eventual resolution, we introduce a third stage (corresponding to
GATT dispute settlement panels) that arises if governments fail to agree on a renegotiated set of
tariffs. In this final stage, the tariffs that are implemented maximize trade volume, subject to the
constraints that the tariffs satisfy the restriction of reciprocity and require no country to import
a volume greater than is implied by its government's proposal in the renegotiation stage.
We now offer a formal description of this three-stage negotiation process. We begin with
some definitions. Given a world price pw that is determined in the first stage of negotiations, we
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will say that a tariff pair ( x , x *) satisfies the restriction of reciprocity if p w ( x , T *) =p w. If in
the renegotiation stage the domestic government announces a domestic tariff f and the foreign
government announces a foreign tariff ?*, then we may define the "implied" tariffs,
x * = x * ( x , p w ) a n d x=x ( x * , p w ) , b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t ( x , x * ( x , p w ) ) a n d
(T {x* ,pw) , ?*) satisfy the restriction of reciprocity. We may then say that the announced
tariffs, x and V, agree if ( t , T* (x ,pw) ) = (x (x*,pv) , f *) . When the announced tariffs do
not agree, the tariff pair ( T , x *) that is implemented in the final stage is said to satisfy the
restriction of announced import limits if the domestic import volume under ( T , T *) is no greater
than the implied import volume Mx(p(x ,pw) ,pw) and the foreign import volume under
(xfx*) is no greater than the implied import volume M* {p* (x*,pw) fpw) . This final
restriction formalizes the idea that neither government can be forced to import a volume greater
than implied by its own proposal in the renegotiation stage.
We are prepared now to formally define the Bilateral Negotiation Game:
Stage 1: Governments bargain and a world price, pw, is determined.
Stage 2: The domestic government announces a domestic tariff, x, at the same time
that the foreign government announces a foreign tariff, x*. If the tariff
announcements agree, then they are implemented as the outcome of the
negotiation.
Stage 3: If the tariff announcements do not agree, then the tariffs that are
implemented are those which maximize trade volume, subject to the
constraints that the tariffs satisfy the restrictions of reciprocity and
announced import limits.
We first determine the tariffs that can be achieved under the representation of reciprocity given
in stages 2 and 3, and later provide a formal description of the stage-1 bargaining process.14
14Observe that nothing "happens" between stages one and two (i.e., no "shock," no new information). This is
consistent with the fact that no justification need be given for renegotiation under Article XXVIII. GATTs Article
XIX also provides for the (in this case temporary) suspension of tariff commitments, and authorizes trading partners
to temporarily suspend "substantially equivalent concessions" of their own. However, in contrast to Article XXVIII,
recourse to Article XIX requires that a country establish injury as a result of "unforeseen developments" in the
presence of the concession it seeks to suspend (Dam, 1970, p. 101).
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To begin, we take the world price p^and the announced tariffs x and f * as given, and
we characterize the tariffs that are actually implemented. There are two cases. If the
governments agree in stage 2, with (x ,x* (x ,pw) ) = {x (x* ,pw) , x*) , then these tariffs are
implemented. If instead the governments do not agree in stage 2, then the implemented tariffs
are those which solve the following program:
subject to
(A). pw(x,x*)=pw
(B). Mx(p(x,pw(x,x *)),pw(x,x *)) <Mx(p(x
(Q. M ; ( p \ x \ p w ( x ;
This program captures the role of the dispute resolution panel as we have described it above:
maximize trade volume, subject to the restrictions of reciprocity (given in constraint (A)) and
announced import limits (given in constraints (B) and (C)).15
To solve this program, we substitute constraint (A) into the objective and constraints (B)
and (C), and we then use (1) and (2) to represent constraint (C) in terms of domestic import
volume. These steps deliver the simplified and equivalent program:
Maxx M,Cp
subject to
where the choice of x then implies a choice for x* under the restriction of reciprocity. It is now
apparent that the constraint must bind; therefore, in the two-country model, the dispute settlement
panel simply chooses the announced tariff which is most restrictive, in the sense of implying the
15With the world price fixed, maximizing import volume maximizes export volume as well.
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least trade volume under the restriction of reciprocity.16
The tariffs that are implemented in stage 3, which are denoted as (f (pw) , x* (pw) ) , are
now straightforward to characterize. Since the volume constraint is sure to bind at the highest
announced tariff, we have that:
It may now be observed that the pair (f (pw) , x* (pw) ) generates the stage-2 announcements,
in the case that governments agree in stage 2. As a general matter, therefore, tariff
announcements by the domestic and foreign governments in stage 2 lead to an implemented tariff
pair, (x {pw) , x* {pw) ) , where this pair in turn determines local prices and thus domestic- and
foreign-government welfare, W and W*.
With the mapping from stage-2 announcements to welfare levels now characterized, we
consider the stage-2 announcements themselves and determine the tariffs that can be implemented
through the Bilateral Negotiation Game. To this end, we define the following tariffs:
satisfies WJipfriF)*")^
satisfies W*.(p *(T*jF)jp^ =0.
These tariffs identify the respective preferred tariffs of the domestic and foreign governments,
under the restriction of reciprocity. Figure 3 illustrates. The preferred tariffs T° (pw) and
x *° (pw) are determined in Figure 3 by the tangency of the respective government's iso-welfare
contour with the iso-world-price locus defined by the restriction of reciprocity. It is now direct
to verify that, given pw, it is a dominant strategy in the subgame corresponding to stages 2 and
3 for the domestic government to announce x=x°{pw) and for the foreign government to
16Thus, our results for the two-country model would continue to hold if we replaced stage 3 in the Bilateral
Negotiation Game with a direct requirement that the most-restrictive announced tariff pair is imposed. Other dispute
settlement approaches can also be considered that preserve our findings. We adopt the specific representation of the
dispute settlement process embodied in stage 3 for two reasons. First, it seems to correspond reasonably with the
actual manner in which disputes are resolved. Second, it leads naturally to the definition of the Multilateral
Negotiation Game offered in the next section for our multi-country model.
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announce T*=T*° (pw) .1? With this we say that a tariff pair (T , T*) can be implemented under
reciprocity if there exists a pw such that
(11)
Using the positive slope of the iso-world-price locus, we see that if T=T 0 (pw) , then
x* (x,pw) >u*° (pw) . Similarly, i f x=x (x*° (pw) ,pw) , then x*° (pw) >x* (x° (pw) ,pw) .
We may now state a property of any tariff pair that can be implemented under reciprocity:
Lemma 1: A tariff pair ( T , T *) can be implemented under reciprocity only if there existsp
at at ( T ,
, W*.=0] .
such th , T * ) we have pw(x,x*) =pw and either {Wp=0 ,W**>0] or
Proof: Suppose ( T , T *) can be implemented under reciprocity. Then there exists pw such that
( T , T*) satisfy (10) and (11) and thus pw{z,x*) =pw. If T=T° (pw) , then the implemented
tariff pair (T° (pw) , T* (T° (pw) ) ) satisfies T* (T° (pw) ,pw) >T*° (pw) , and so Wp=0 and,
using the second order condition that IV*, »<0, we have also that W**>0. If instead
T=-C (T*° {pw) ,pw) , then the implemented tariff pair (T (T*° (pw) ) ,pw) , x*° {pw) ) satisfies
T (T*° (pw) ,pw) >xQ (pw) , and so W*t=0 and, using the second order condition that Wpp<0, we
have also that Wp<0. QED
''Consider the domestic government. Suppose that its announcement is implemented (i.e.,?^T (f *,pw) ) and
that its announcement is more restrictive than is x° (pw) (i.e., f >T° (pw)). If it were instead to announce T° (pw),
then the implemented tariff pair would be : (f (pw) =max{x0 (pw) , T (f *,pw) } ; T* (pw) =x* (x (pv)
 f p1') ) .
The implemented tariff pair is unaffected if f =x (f *, pw) ; on the other hand, if f > T (f *, pw) , then the implemented
tariff pair when the domestic government announces T° (pw) is no less restrictive than the pair
(T° (pw) ,x*(xQ{pw) ,pw) ) and is strictly closer to this pair than was the original implemented tariff pair
(f, T* (T ,pw) ) . Assuming that the second order condition Wpp<0 is met, the domestic government does no less
well and sometimes strictly better with the announcement T° (pw) than with the proposed announcement f. The
other possibilities can be handled similarly.
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Lemma 1 says that a pair of tariffs can be implemented under reciprocity only if, when faced with
the fixed world prices required under reciprocity by that tariff pair, at least one government is
content with the volume of trade and no government wants to reduce trade volume. In the case
illustrated in Figure 3, for example, the domestic tariff T° (pw) and the implied foreign tariff can
be implemented under reciprocity, and at this tariff pair the domestic (foreign) government is
content with (desires more than) the prevailing trade volume under reciprocity. By contrast, the
foreign tariff z*° (pw) pictured in Figure 3 and the implied domestic tariff can not be
implemented under reciprocity, as at this tariff pair the foreign (domestic) government is content
with (desires less than) the prevailing trade volume under reciprocity.
We are now in a position to determine whether efficient trade agreements can be
implemented under reciprocity and, if so, the form that these agreements take. Our results are
contained in the next proposition:
Proposition 5: An efficient trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity if and
only if it is characterized by tariffs which are set at their politically optimal
levels.
Proof: Recall from Proposition 3 that politically optimal tariffs are efficient. Furthermore, by
(8), (10) and (11), politically optimal tariffs can be implemented under reciprocity: given the
politically optimal world price, it is a dominant strategy for each government to announce its
politically optimal tariff, and a stage-2 agreement is thus achieved. Expression (9) characterizes
the efficiency frontier, and along this frontier it is necessary that Wp=0 = W*, or Wp*Q *W*t. Since
Lemma 1 indicates that a tariff pair can be implemented under reciprocity only if Wp=0 or
Pi£*=0, the only efficient tariff pair that can be implemented under reciprocity is the politically
optimal tariff pair. QED
Intuitively, reciprocity gives each government the power to renegotiate along the existing
iso-world-price locus to a position of reduced trade volume. If the existing agreement is efficient
and achieves the political optimum, then no government will wish to renegotiate to seek reduced
trade volume along the prevailing iso-world-price line. If the existing agreement is efficient but
does not achieve the political optimum, then some government will wish to renegotiate along the
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prevailing iso-world-price locus to a position of reduced trade volume, rendering the renegotiated
agreement inefficient.
Finally, in the top panel of Figure 4 we characterize the complete locus of reciprocal trade
agreements implementable under reciprocity. With T and x* on the vertical and horizontal axis,
respectively, the efficiency locus is labelled E-+E, with its bold portion corresponding to the
contract curve, and with the politically optimal point labelled PO. Also depicted are the loci
corresponding to Wp=0 and W**=0.ls These loci intersect at the political optimum point PO, and
at this point of intersection the Wp=0 (W** = 0) locus is flatter (steeper) than the efficiency
locus. The locus of tariff combinations implementable under reciprocity in a reciprocal trade
agreement corresponds to the upper envelope of the portions of the Wp=0 and W**=0 loci that
lie on or above the efficiency locus and inside the Nash welfare contours of the two governments,
and we label this locus R^PO^R. As the figure illustrates, only one efficient trade agreement can
be implemented under reciprocity, and this occurs when there is agreement at the politically
optimal tariffs.
The lower panel of Figure 4 translates the information from the top panel into welfare
space. The vertical axis measures W, while the horizontal axis measures W*, with the Nash
welfare levels of each government marked at the origin. The dashed curve represents the
efficiency frontier, with welfare levels corresponding to those achieved on the efficiency locus
in the top panel. The solid curve in the lower panel represents the combinations of welfare
achievable under reciprocity in a reciprocal trade agreement, corresponding to welfare levels along
R-*PO->R in the top panel. As depicted in the lower panel, reciprocity has the effect of shrinking
the feasible set of bargaining outcomes to lie within the efficiency frontier at all but the politically
optimal point.
We have been purposely vague as to the manner in which governments interact in the first
stage. As Figure 4 illustrates, the frontier of combinations of welfare achievable under the
constraint of reciprocity (i.e., stages 2 and 3) is "kinked" at the political optimum. If we think
18In Figure 4 we depict the loci corresponding to Wp=0 and W* = 0 as negatively sloped, though this is not
needed for our results and need not be the case.
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of the stage-1 bargaining process as corresponding to the maximization of a general function that
is increasing in the welfare of each government, then it is natural to expect that the iso-quantity
contours of this function are downward sloping in the space of tariffs. With the constraint of
reciprocity providing a kink at the political optimum over the set of implementable tariff pairs,
it is clear that the politically optimal tariffs will be selected under a wide range of bargaining
procedures that might characterize stage 1. Further, as Proposition 5 states, the politically optimal
tariffs must be selected, if the stage-1 bargaining process is to deliver an efficient outcome, given
the constraint that the outcome can be implemented under reciprocity.19
IV. Non-discrimination
Along with reciprocity, the principle of non-discrimination (MFN) provides the second
pillar of the foundation upon which GATT is built. We now extend our framework to a multi-
country setting in order to assess the role of non-discrimination in multilateral trade agreements.
A. The Economic Environment
We assume that there is one home country (no *) who is a natural importer of x but that
there are now three foreign countries (*), indexed by j={ 1,2,3}, who are natural importers of y.20
The three foreign countries are assumed to have no basis for trade between them in the absence
of discriminatory tariffs. Moreover, we do not allow discriminatory tariffs to induce "unnatural"
trade between the three foreign countries, nor do we allow such tariffs to reverse the natural
pattern of trade between the home country and any of its foreign trading partners. As such, each
foreign country trades only with the home country, who imports x from each of its foreign trading
partners in exchange for exports of y, and who is therefore the only country that has the
opportunity to set discriminatory tariffs across its trading partners.
19For example, if countries are sufficiently symmetric and bargaining in stage 1 of the Bilateral Negotiation Game
is governed by the Nash Bargaining Solution, then the equilibrium outcome of this Bilateral Negotiation Game is
the politically optimal trade policy.
20Three is the minimal number of foreign countries that will allow us to consider the role of non-discrimination
in a multilateral agreement when the domestic country is also a member of a preferential agreement. This question
is the subject of Section V.
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Denoting the set of foreign countries by N*={ 1,2,3}, we continue to define p=px/py as
the national relative price facing producers and consumers in the home country, with
p*J=PxJ /PyJ for jeN* the national relative price facing producers and consumers in foreign
country j . With tj (t*j) representing the non-prohibitive home country (foreign country j) ad
valorem tariff on imports from foreign country j (the home country), and with T j'= (1 +1 j) and
x*j=(l + t*j) , we have p=xjpwj=p(-cj,pwi) and p*j=pwJ/x*j=p*j (z*jrpwJ) for jeN*,
where pwj =PxJ/Py is the "world" (untaxed) relative price for trade between the home country
and foreign country j . Finally, we note that bilateral trades link world prices according to
pwj=[xk/T:j]xpwk, jeN\ keN*. <12)
Thus, a home-country policy of MFN implies T1 =T2=T3 and hence pwl=pw2=pw3 =pw, while tariff
discrimination across imports from foreign countries j and k implies xJ^-zk and hence pwi*pwk.
As each foreign country has only one trading partner (the home country), its terms of trade
are given simply by p WJ'. Consequently, foreign production and consumption decisions can be
characterized as in our two-country model. Specifically, production in a foreign country is
determined by selecting the point on its production possibilities frontier at which the marginal rate
of transformation between x and y is equal to local relative prices: Q]3 -Q]3 (p*J) for i={x,y}
and jeN*. Consumption of good i by foreign country j can be represented as
Dp'=Dp (p*J,R*J) , with R*j, the tariff revenue of foreign country j , defined implicitly by
R*J=[D*j(p*j,R*j)-Qyj(p*j)]x[l/p*j-l/pwj] or R*i=R*Up*J,pwi) . As before,
each foreign country's tariff revenue will be an increasing function of its terms of trade under the
assumption that goods are normal, and national consumption in each foreign country can thus be
written as C*j (p*j,pwj) =D*j (p*j, R*j {p*j,pwj) ) . Finally, foreign country j's exports of
x, E*J (p*J (x*j',pWJ) ,pWJ) , are defined as the difference between its production and
consumption of x, while foreign country j's imports of y, M*J {p*j (x*J ,pWJ) ,pwj) , are given
by the difference between its consumption and production of y.
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The presence of multiple trading partners for the domestic country potentially complicates
matters, as the home country may face different terms of trade with each of its trading partners.
This will not affect the determination of domestic production, which is still found at the point on
the domestic production possibilities frontier where the marginal rate of transformation between
x and y is equal to local relative prices: Q^Q^ip) for i={x,y}. And domestic consumption of
good i will still be determined as a function of the local relative price and domestic tariff revenue:
D± ip,R) for i={x,y}. But owing to the possibility of discriminatory tariffs, domestic tariff
revenue will now depend not only on the total volume of x imported by the domestic country,
but also on the shares of the total imported from each trading partner.
To derive an expression for domestic tariff revenue, we let {p*j} and {p^} denote,
respectively, the set of local and world prices for jeN*, and we define bilateral trade shares by
We then define the domestic country's multilateral terms of trade by the trade-weighted average
of the set of bilateral world prices:
With this, domestic tariff revenue is defined implicitly by
or R=R{p, T) . The domestic country's consumption can now be represented as
Ci (p, T) =D± (p, R(p, T) ) . Henceforth, we will refer to T as the home country's terms of
trade, and it will play a role analogous to that of pw in the two-country model of the previous
sections. In fact, as (12) indicates, if the home country adopts an MFN tariff policy, then
T=p wl =p w2=p w3 =p w. However, a discriminatory tariff policy implies T*p wj for j eN*.
Total domestic imports of x, Mx(p(xjfpwj) , T( {p*J (x*J,pwj) } , {pwj}) ) , are then
given by the difference between home-country consumption and production of x, while home-
country exports of y, Ey(p(xj,pwj) , T{ {p*j {%*j,pwj) } , {pwj}) ) , are given by the
difference between home-country production and consumption of y. Home and foreign budget
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constraints imply that, for any world prices, we have
*
jpw; , p w j ) , p w j ) , jeN*.
With {TJ} ({T*J}) representing the set of domestic (foreign) tariffs for jeN*, we denote the
equilibrium world price for trade between the home and foreign country j by
pwJ ({xJ} , {T* J} ) . The set of equilibrium world prices for jeN* is then determined by (12) and
the market-clearing condition for good x:
with equilibrium in the y-market then assured by (13).
Finally, as before, we represent the objectives of each government as a general function
of its national prices and its terms of trade, and assume that, with national prices held fixed, each
government strictly prefers improvements in its terms of trade. Thus we have the objectives of
the home government given by
with WT{p,T) <0. Similarly, the objectives of foreign government j are given by
W*Hp*Hx^fp^) ,pwj), with w;jwj(p*j,Pwj)>0.
The home government welfare function embodies a novel pattern of externalities. As
before, the tariff level selected by a foreign country alters world prices, and this in turn affects
the home country's (multilateral) terms of trade and imparts a home-government externality
through the consequent change in tariff revenue. In the multi-country model, however, the tariff
level selected by a foreign country may also exert a home-government externality through the
effect that the tariff has on the foreign local price and thereby the home country's (multilateral)
terms of trade and tariff revenue. Intuitively, for any given total import volume for the home
country, if the home country sets tariffs in a discriminatory fashion, then the home government
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receives greater tariff revenue when a larger fraction of imports emanates from the foreign country
that faces the highest import tariff. The foreign export volumes, however, are determined by
foreign local prices, and therefore foreign local prices impart a home-government externality when
home tariffs are discriminatory. Importantly, this "local-price externality" disappears when the
home government's tariffs satisfy MFN, since in that event the multilateral terms of trade is
independent of foreign local prices and given simply by the (common) world price.
B. Non-discrimination and the Efficiency Frontier
As in our analysis of the two-country model, we begin by considering the trade policies
that would be chosen in the absence of a trade agreement. To this end, we suppose that the
domestic government selects a tariff policy, (xl,x2,x3), to maximize its welfare, W, at the same time
that each foreign government j chooses its tariff policy, x*\ to maximize its welfare, W*j. The
resulting best-response functions must satisfy
Home: Wn + VWT = 0, for j=1,2,3 (1 5 a)p
Foreign: W*{ + VSW*{, = 0, for j=1,2,3, (1 5 b)
with Xj=[dT/dxJ]/[dp/dx^] and X*j= [dpwj/dx*j] / [dp*i/dx*i] . A set of Nash
equilibrium tariffs will place each government on its best-response function(s). Notice that (15a)
implies the condition that the three domestic tariffs (x\x2,x3) should be set so as to equate on the
margin the relative impact of each tariff on domestic local prices and the domestic terms of trade
(i.e., X1=X2=X3). This condition will in general require tariff discrimination on the part of the
domestic government in the Nash equilibrium. In particular, were the domestic tariffs set in
accordance with MFN, this condition would in general be violated, and a small adjustment in
domestic tariff levels could be found which, taking foreign tariffs as fixed, would leave the
domestic local price unaltered and lead to an improvement in the domestic country's terms of
trade. As such, tariff discrimination will in general be required in the Nash equilibrium to ensure
that the domestic tariffs are set to achieve the most-favorable terms of trade for the domestic
country consistent with the desired domestic local price.
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We next characterize the efficiency locus. To do this, we fix the welfare levels of each
foreign government and characterize the set of tariffs that maximizes the welfare of the domestic
government. This defines a point on the efficiency locus. By varying foreign welfare levels over
all feasible values, the entire efficiency locus can be described.
We first define pwj'(x *j', Vtj) as the equilibrium world price for trade between the
domestic country and foreign country j that would provide the government of country j with the
welfare level W*J when its tariff is set at T*J. This magnitude is defined implicitly by
W*J (p*J {x*j ,pwj) ,pwJ) =W\ and we note that21
Since the three foreign tariff and welfare levels, {x*j} and {W*j}, determine a complete set of
both world and foreign local prices, they also imply a value for the domestic terms of trade:
Finally, by equilibrium condition (14), a value for the domestic local price is implied as well, and
we denote it by p ( {x*j} , {vfj}) .
We can now write the welfare of the domestic government as a function of the three
foreign tariffs and foreign welfare levels, or W(p({z*j} , {W*j}) ,T{{x*j}, {W*j}) ) .
Choosing foreign tariffs to maximize the domestic welfare level then defines a point on the
efficiency frontier. The first-order conditions are
Wp + VjWT = 0, for y=l,2,3, (17>
where Vj= [8r/8x*J'] / [8p/8-u*J] and where dp/dx*j is non-zero and finite. An implication
of (17) is that Nash tariffs are inefficient. This can be seen by fixing foreign welfare levels at
21For simplicity we treat pwj ( T * J , W*J) as a well-defined function of t*j, which it must be provided that W*j is
sufficiently close to a representation of national income. Cases where there exists more than onQpwj that solves
JV*J (p* J ( T * J , P V J ) ,pwj) =W*j can be handled with appropriate modifications without changing our results.
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their Nash values, and observing that efficient tariffs satisfy (17) while Nash tariffs satisfy (15a).
Before exploring the nature of efficient multilateral trade agreements, we extend to our
multi-country setting the definition of politically optimal tariffs. In analogy with our two-country
setting, we define politically optimal tariffs as a set of tariffs ({xjP0},{i;*jP0}) for jeN* that satisfies
Wp = 0, (18a)
W*{ = 0, for 7=1,2,3. (1 8 b)
Notice that (18a) and (18b) comprise a set of four equations that must be met by a set of six
tariffs (three domestic, three foreign) to conform to political optimality. As such, there will in
general be many combinations of tariffs that are politically optimal. However, if the additional
restriction of MFN is imposed, the number of tariffs drops to four (one domestic, three foreign)
and in general a unique set of politically optimal tariffs conforming to MFN may be expected.
We can now state conditions under which politically optimal tariffs will be efficient in our
multi-country setting:
Proposition 6: Politically optimal tariffs are efficient if and only if they conform to MFN.
Proof: Suppose that a set of tariffs are politically optimal. Then by (17) and (18a), they will be
efficient if and only if 8r/6x*J=0 for jeN*. From the definition of T, we have
df 1 dE*J An*J dEl3 ctiFHT*! W*h • - *i
Xdpwj
But political optimality implies, by (16) and (18b), that dpwj (x*j, vtj) /dx*j = 0, and hence
under political optimality we have
dT 1 d £ *J An *j
— = J_x[i5L
d*j M dp
which will be zero if and only if tariffs also conform to MFN. QED
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Proposition 6 establishes an "affinity" between politically optimal tariffs and the principle
of non-discrimination. Intuitively, politically optimal tariffs are efficient provided that the
externalities countries impose on one another in their tariff choices travel through world prices.
In a multi-country world, trade policy externalities will indeed travel in this way if and only if
tariffs conform to MFN. Tariff discrimination complicates the transmission of externalities across
trading partners by allowing bilateral trade volumes, and hence local prices, to transmit
externalities as well. Finally, we note that non-discrimination is not a general property of points
on the efficiency frontier, but is a rather special property required only by political optimality.
To see that there are many points on the efficiency frontier which require tariff discrimination to
reach, note that in general the foreign tariff choices {f*J} that solve (17) will imply bilateral
world prices pwj (x *j', IV*J) that differ across jeN*, and hence require tariff discrimination on the
part of the domestic country.
C. Reciprocity and Non-discrimination
We now extend our earlier exploration of reciprocity to the many-country setting
developed above, and interpret and evaluate the role of non-discrimination in the presence of
reciprocity. To this end, we first adapt our earlier definition of reciprocity to a multi-country
setting. Keeping with our interpretation of reciprocity as calling for equal changes in exports and
imports across trading partners, and in analogy with our two-country treatment, we will say that
a set of tariff changes A T J = ( T J 2 - T J °) and A T *J' = ( T *J' •* - u *J# °) conforms to reciprocity provided
that, for jeN*,
-E*j(p *\x *J°jF#)f*°)] =M*J(p *\x *jl,pwjl),pwjl) -My%
Trade balance (condition (13)) implies that this expression can be reduced to
= 0 fory=l,2,3.
Hence, as before, mutual changes in trade policy that conform to reciprocity will leave world
prices unchanged.
We are again interested in characterizing the conditions under which an efficient
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multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity. We therefore now consider
the appropriate extension of the Bilateral Negotiation Game of the previous section to our multi-
country model. As before, we posit a negotiation process that begins with an initial stage
(corresponding to Article XXVIII bis) in which tariffs are bound at specified levels, determining
a set of bilateral world prices. In the second stage of negotiation (corresponding to Article
XXVIII) governments make renegotiation proposals, where under the restriction of reciprocity the
bilateral world prices must be preserved. If governments fail to reach an agreement in this
renegotiation stage, a third stage is entered (corresponding to GATT dispute settlement panels)
in which tariffs are implemented that maximize multilateral trade volume, subject to the
constraints that the tariffs satisfy the restriction of reciprocity and require no government to import
a bilateral volume in excess of that implied by its proposal in the renegotiation stage.
We now develop a formal representation of the trade negotiation process. Letip*-7'}
represent the set of bilateral world prices determined in the first stage of negotiations. In analogy
with the two-country model of the previous section, we will say that a set of tariffs
({t j} , { T *j}) satisfies the restriction of reciprocity if pwi ({x j} , {% *J}) =pwj for each jeN*.
We wish now to explore the foreign tariffs and bilateral trade volumes that are "implied" by the
domestic government's announcement in the renegotiation stage. If the domestic government
announces a set {fJ} of domestic tariffs that satisfy (12), then, in contrast to the two-country
model, the announced tariff set when combined with a fixed set of bilateral world prices {p1^}
does not uniquely imply domestic import volumes nor foreign tariffs.22 We therefore assume that
the domestic government also announces the shares {s*J} of its total import volume that are to
come from each foreign trading partner, where these announced shares are non-negative and sum
to one. If in the renegotiation stage the domestic government announces domestic tariffs {? J}
and trade-volume shares {s*J}, then we define the implied foreign tariffs,
22For a fixed set of domestic tariffs {t j} and bilateral world prices { p ^ } , the local domestic price
p ( T J , pVJ) is implied. In the multi-country model, however, this price alone is insufficient to determine
domestic import volume, since T is affected by the set of foreign tariffs, {T* J} , when domestic tariffs are






 ( {? j} , {s*J} , {p*-7}) , by the requirements that the tariffs ({x j} , {x*j} ) satisfy the
restriction of reciprocity and generate the announced set of trade volume shares:
for all jeN*, where x*H.) denotes the value x*j ({ i j } , {s*J} , {pVj}) P
We consider next the foreign trade volumes and domestic import tariffs that are implied
by the announcements of the foreign governments in the renegotiation stage. We assume that,
in the renegotiation stage, each foreign government j announces its tariff, x *J. Given the bilateral
world price p*"7, this announcement directly implies an import volume for foreign country j , given
as M*J (p *J (x*j, p*-7') , p*-7') . In addition, the three foreign tariff announcements together imply
a set of domestic tariffs, when the bilateral world prices are fixed.24 Thus, if in the renegotiation
stage each foreign government j announces tariff f*J, then the set {x*j} defines an implied set
of domestic tariffs, xj=xj ({x*j] , {p^}) , by the requirement that the tariffs ( {xj} , {?*J'})
satisfy the restriction of reciprocity.
We are now prepared to state two final definitions. First, we say that the announcements
( { T ^ ' I , {s*xj}) and {x*j} agree if ({? J} , { T ^ ( . ) } ) = ( W ( . ) } , {V^}), where as above
x*
j
 ( . ) denotes the value x*j ( {T J} , {s^7} , {p^}) and where xJ' ( . ) denotes the value
x
j
'{{f*J} , {p^}) . Second, when the announcements do not agree, the tariff set
/ {T* J} ) that is implemented in the final stage is said to satisfy the restriction of
23Given {p"-3'} , {f J} and {s*J}, foreign tariffs and bilateral trade volumes are implied as follows. Observe
that p is determined as p=p{xj,^j) while T is determined as T=^,.^ s^xp1"7. It follows that total import
volume is determined as MX=MX (p,T) , where under (14) we have as well that Mx=^2 -eN, Exj • We then have that£^J
is implied as Exj=s*J>^2 • * ExJ, and this in turn implies a value for p*j as p*j=p*j {x*3f,pVj) , and hence a
value for T* J , for each jeN*.
24Given {p"j} and {?*J'}, we have that {p*j} is determined, and so the right-hand side of (14) is also
determined. Furthermore, with {p *j} determined, we see that T is determined as well. Thus, satisfaction of (14)
determines p. But this means that xJ' is implied as TJ=pWj/p.
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announced import limits if the domestic import volume from any foreign trading partner j under




 (p*j' (^*j (•) ,Pwj) /P*-7') and the import volume for any foreign country j under
({ T j} , { T *j'}) is no greater than the implied import volume M* (p * (f *J, p*j) , p^J) , for every
jeN*. This restriction ensures that no government can be forced to import a bilateral volume
greater than implied by its own proposal in the renegotiation stage.
We now define the Multilateral Negotiation Game:
Stage 1: Governments bargain and a set of bilateral world prices, {pwj}, is
determined.
Stage 2: The domestic government announces a set of domestic tariffs, {? J } , and
trade volume shares, {s**}, at the same time that each foreign
government j announces a foreign tariff, f*J. If the announcements agree,
then the tariffs are implemented as the outcome of the negotiation.
Stage 3: If the announcements do not agree, then the tariffs that are implemented
are those which maximize multilateral trade volume, subject to the
constraints that the tariffs satisfy the restrictions of reciprocity and
announced import limits.
As before, we concentrate on stages 2 and 3, in order to determine the tariffs that can be
implemented when reciprocity is represented in this way.
Taking the bilateral world prices, {p*-7'}, and announcements, ({f J} , {s*J}) and
{? * J } , as given, we begin by characterizing the tariffs that are actually implemented. A first
possibility is that the announcements agree, with ( { i J } , {T+J; ( . ) } ) = ( {xj ( . ) } , {t*J}) , in
which case the announced tariffs ({x J}
 7 {x *J}) are implemented. The second possibility is that
the governments fail to reach agreement in the renegotiation stage. In this case, the implemented
tariffs are determined by the stage-3 maximization program:
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subject to
(A). ^0=^, for all jeN*
(B). E;j{p^\^K))^E;j{p^x%)^\^\for all j
(O. M;J(p*W£*Q)zM;J<p*KfJf*)J*), M all jeN\
where pwj ({xj} , {T* J} ) is represented as pwj ( . ) and where x*j (.) again denotes the value
T*j( {f J} / {s^7} , {p*-7'}) . This program chooses tariffs to maximize multilateral trade volume,
subject to the constraints that the tariff selection satisfies the restrictions of reciprocity (given in
constraint (A)) and announced import limits (given in constraints (B) and (C)).
As before, we substitute constraint (A) into the objective and constraints (B) and (C).
Next, we use (13) to represent constraint (C) in terms of bilateral export volumes. These steps
yield the following equivalent program:
subject to
where the choice of {T* J} implies a selection for {uJ} under the restriction of reciprocity. The
solution to the program is now immediate: for each jeN*, T*J is set optimally when the
constraint associated with the stage-2 announcements concerning the bilateral trading volume
between the domestic country and foreign country j binds.
To convert this finding about export volumes into an implication for tariffs, we observe
that, under the assumptions that substitution effects dominate income effects and that the Metzler
paradox is ruled out, if follows that dE*j/dp*j>0>dp*j/dx*j for each jeN*. Under these
assumptions, the export volume of foreign country j is lower when the foreign tariff x *J is higher,
and so the constraint binds at the highest announced (or implied) tariff for imports into foreign
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country j . Letting ({x J ({p*-7'}) } , {f *J ({pw^}) }) denote the tariffs implemented in stage 3,
we thus have that, for each jeN*:
where x*j ( . ) again denotes the value x*j ({? j} , {§*J} , {p*j}) and where xj ({p*j}) is
thus set to satisfy the restriction of reciprocity. Notice that the stage-3 implementation solution
generates the stage-2 tariff announcements when governments agree in stage 2. We thus now
have a complete mapping from stage-2 announcements to welfare functions: a set of
announcements in stage 2 results in an implemented set of tariffs, ({? J {p*-7}} , {f*J {p*-7}}) ,
and these tariffs in turn determine local prices and therefore W and W*j, for all jeN*.
With stage 3 characterized, we next determine the stage-2 announcements. Consider first
the government of any foreign country j . Let us define the following tariff:
u'-'V-O satisfies W*sJp*s(T:*Jjpt)jF)=O (21)
This tariff is the preferred tariff of the government of foreign country j , under the restriction of
reciprocity. In the subgame corresponding to stages 2 and 3, for fixed p*-7', it is straightforward
to verify that it is a dominant strategy for the government of foreign county j to announce
f *J=x*J° (p*-7) ,25 The implied export volume associated with this announcement is denoted as:
Consider next the domestic government. As its share announcements must sum to unity,
this government seeks to allocate its share announcements in the most advantageous fashion. This
"Consider the government of foreign country j and suppose x*j>x*J° (pwj) . If the announcement x*j is most
restrictive (i.e., if f * J '^T* J ( . ) ) , then the implemented export volume is E*j (p*j (x* J , p^ ) ,pVj') , generating
welfare W*i (p* J (f *J,pWj) ,pwj) . By announcing instead T* J0 (p*"-7') , the government of foreign country j would
receive the higher welfare W*i (p*J {x^°{pwj) ,PWj') ,PVj) if x ^ ° ( p ^ ) >x*i ( . ) . On the other hand, if
x *
j
 ( . ) e ( x * j 0 (p^j) , f *j] , t h e n t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t x*J° (p*- 7 ' ) p r o d u c e s w e l f a r e W*j ( p * j ( x * j ( . ) , p w j ) , p w j ) ,
which is no lower than and perhaps higher than ( i f Vj>x*3' {.) ) that received with the announcement x*J under
the second order condition W*ttJ<0. The other possibilities can be handled similarly.
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calculation, however, depends on the anticipated volumes that are implied by the foreign
announcements. There is little hope, therefore, in finding a dominant strategy for the domestic
government. We thus assume that the domestic government recognizes that foreign governments
will choose their dominant strategies, and hence chooses a best response to {T* J 0 (p*-7) } .
Without loss of generality, let us order the bilateral world prices that the domestic
government confronts as pvL<pvM<pwH. Our maintained assumption that bilateral trade volumes
in any negotiated agreement are positive ensures that the domestic government chooses to trade
with all partners. Thus, when the domestic government chooses its announcements optimally, it
must be that:
<22>
( 2 3 )
where again x*J ( . ) denotes the value T*J ({f-7} , is**} , {p*-7}) . Intuitively, the domestic
government chooses its announcements so that it trades as much as possible with the partners with
whom it has the most favorable terms of trade.
Consider finally the bilateral volume between the domestic country and foreign country
H. Suppose first that when the composition of export volumes is {E*j0 (p*-7) }, the domestic
government has Wp<0, indicating that it (weakly) seeks more trade. In this case, it is optimal for
the domestic government to set its announcements so that
<24a>
In the implemented outcome, we have agreement in stage 2 with Wp<0 = W*^ for all jeN*.
Suppose second that, when the composition of export volumes is {E*JO (p*-7) } , the domestic
government has Wp> 0, indicating that this volume of trade is higher than it prefers. In this
second case, our maintained assumption that bilateral trade volumes in any negotiated agreement
are positive implies that there exists a lower (but still positive) trade volume with foreign country
H, given as E*H ({p*-7}) , which when combined with the volumes in (22) and (23) gives Wp=0.
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The domestic government then optimally sets its announcements so that
In the implemented outcome, we then have agreement in stage 2 with Wp=Q = W*iL=W*^M and
W*?H> 0, as the government of foreign country H prefers more trade.
We now say that a tariff set ({ T J} , { T *J}) can be implemented under reciprocity if there
exists a set of bilateral world prices {p^} such that the tariffs satisfy (21)-(23) and (24a) or
(24b) (as appropriate). The results derived above may now be summarized as follows:
Lemma 2: A tariff set ( { i J } , {T*-7} ) can be implemented under reciprocity only if there
exists a set of bilateral world prices {p^} such that at ( {T J } , {x*j}) we have
pwj({xj} , Wj\) =]3*j for all jeN* and either {Wp=0fW*^>0 for jeN*} or
{W<0, W*ij=0 for jeN*} .
With this lemma in place, we are prepared to determine the conditions under which an efficient
multilateral agreement can be implemented under reciprocity. Our result is contained in the next
proposition:
Proposition 7: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under
reciprocity if and only if it is characterized by tariffs which conform to the
principle of MFN and are set at their politically optimal levels.
Proof: Suppose first that the world prices are set at their politically optimal and MFN levels.
Then the foreign governments announce their politically optimal tariffs, as (21) requires, and the
domestic government achieves W =0 by announcing its politically optimal MFN tariffs, as (22)-
(24a) require. Thus, the politically optimal MFN tariffs can be implemented under reciprocity
in a stage-2 agreement. By Proposition 6, they are also efficient. Suppose next that an agreement
is implemented under reciprocity which does not entail politically optimal MFN tariffs. If tariffs
are politically optimal but not MFN, then by Proposition 6 they are not efficient. Suppose then,
that the tariffs are not politically optimal (and may or may not conform to MFN). As they are
implementable under reciprocity, Lemma 2 implies that there are then two cases to consider:
(i){ Wp=0, W*ij>0 for jeN* with a strict inequality for at least one j }: In this case,
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(17) implies that we have efficiency if and only if dT/dx*j=0 for jeN*. By (16), we must have
dp^ix*!, W*3) /dx*ho and thus, by (19), efficiency requires discriminatory tariffs. But then
let k solve min.{pw:7'} and observe that dT/dx*k>0.26 This implies that efficiency is not
achieved whenever W**7>0 for at least one i.
(ii) {^p<0,^p*i=0 for jeN*}: In this case, (16) implies that dpwj (x*J', W*j) /dx*j=0
for each j , and thus that dT/dx*j is given by (20) for each j . Then by (17) and (20), tariffs
must be discriminatory if they are to be efficient. Moreover, noting thatdpWJ (T* J , W*J) /dx*j=0
also implies dp/dz*j>0 for each j , it follows from (17) that dT/dx*j must then be strictly
negative for each j if efficiency is to be achieved. But then let k solve min.j{pwj} and observe
that dT/dx*k>0 by (20), implying that efficiency is not achieved when Wp<0. QED
The broad implication behind Proposition 7 is that the principle of reciprocity serves well
as a means to promote efficient multilateral agreements when trade policy externalities travel only
through world prices. When governments abide by the principle of MFN, externalities indeed
travel in this way, and so reciprocity and non-discrimination work in concert as principles that
guide governments to efficient multilateral trade agreements.
V. Preferential Agreements
While the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination form the pillars of GATT, a
major exception to the latter principle is allowed for the purpose of creating preferential
agreements. This exception, embodied in Article XXIV of GATT, was controversial in its
inception and has met with renewed controversy recently as many GATT members » but most
especially the United States ~ have increasingly exercised their rights under this article to
negotiate preferential agreements. In this section we use our framework to address a central
question in this controversy: Will preferential agreements interfere with a multilateral trading
26This follows provided that dE*J/dp*j>0 and dE*j/dpwj<0. The latter condition is ensured by our
assumption that all goods are normal in consumption, while the former condition is posited above and will be met
as long as substitution effects dominate income effects.
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system that is built upon the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination?
In accord with Article XXIV, we consider two forms of preferential agreements. We will
say that the domestic country forms a free trade area with foreign country i if X1=O=T*1 and Tj >0
for some j*i. A customs union is distinguished from a free trade area in that, in addition to
eliminating all internal trade barriers, the members of the customs union adopt a common external
tariff policy as well. As the external tariff decisions of the customs union are centralized, the
objectives of the tariff authorities in the customs union must be defined. If the domestic country
forms a customs union with foreign country i, we represent the objectives of the customs union
by the function U(W, W*1) and assume that U is increasing in both arguments and satisfies
globally the second-order conditions associated with the maximization problem developed below.
We consider first the presence of free trade areas. In particular, suppose that the domestic
government establishes a free trade area with foreign country i. We may now report an
immediate implication of Proposition 7:
Proposition 8: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can not be implemented under
reciprocity in the presence of a free trade agreement.
As Proposition 8 indicates, free trade agreements are fundamentally at odds with a multilateral
trading system that is built on the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination: the legitimacy of
reciprocity at the multilateral level is undermined when exceptions from non-discrimination are
granted for the creation of free trade areas. This is because, to deliver efficiency, reciprocity
requires a world in which the transmission of externalities is contained within world price
movements, but externalities travel through local prices as well when tariffs are discriminatory
(as when some countries form a free trade area). Consequently, the efficiency properties of
politically optimal MFN external tariffs are lost when a free trade agreement is created.
Now consider the creation of a customs union between the domestic country and foreign
country i. Proposition 7 no longer directly applies, since the creation of a customs union reduces
the number of external tariff authorities from four to three. But Proposition 7 is instructive, in
that it suggests that reciprocity might continue to deliver an efficient multilateral agreement in the
presence of a customs union, provided that the union became as a single country in the previous
analysis and that all external tariffs were then set at the politically optimal MFN levels.
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To explore this possibility, we note that a customs union between the domestic country
and foreign country i will eliminate internal barriers to trade and set external barriers according
to the objectives of the common tariff-setting authority, U(WfW*2), implying that
p=p *i=pwi=pcu and also that the two countries share in the tariff revenue associated with their
common external terms of trade, T=TCU. It therefore follows that the objectives of the customs
union are given by U(W, W*d) = U(W(pcu, Tcu) , W*Hpcu, Tcu) =Wcu(pcuf Tcu) ,with W™u<0.
With W*i [p * J , pwi) still representing the objectives of each foreign government j*i that is not
a member of the customs union, it follows as a consequence of Proposition 7 that efficiency with
respectto Wcu{pcu, Tcu) and W*J (p *J, pVJ) j*i can be achieved under reciprocity if and only
if the external tariffs of the customs union and the tariffs of all other countries conform to the
principle of MFN and are set at their politically optimal levels. The remaining question is then
whether it is also internally efficient (i.e., with respect to W and W*1) for members of the customs
union to share a common local-market price. If the tariff revenue collected by the customs union
can be divided between its members in such a way that internal efficiency is achieved at the
common price prevailing in the local market, (a possibility that is ensured if the political
preferences and income levels of the two countries are sufficiently similar), we will call the two
countries natural integration partners, as the formation of a customs union then need not create
internal inefficiencies. We can now state:
Proposition 9: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under
reciprocity in the presence of a customs union if and only if the members
of the customs union are natural integration partners and the external tariffs
of the customs union and the tariffs of all other countries conform to the
principle of MFN and are set at their politically optimal levels.
Together, Propositions 8 and 9 identify a rather limited set of circumstances under which
preferential agreements can coexist in harmony with a multilateral trading system built on the
pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination. These results are summarized in a final proposition:
Proposition 10: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under
reciprocity in the presence of a preferential agreement if and only if the
multilateral agreement is characterized as follows:
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(i). Each country that is not a member of a preferential agreement must
abide by the principle of non-discrimination (MFN) and set its tariffs at a
level which is politically optimal; and
(ii). Each country that is a member of a preferential agreement must belong
to a customs union between natural integration partners that sets its external
tariffs in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination (MFN) and
at a level which is politically optimal for the customs union.
VI. Conclusion
Working within a general equilibrium model and adopting a representation of government
trade policy objectives that includes each of the major formulations of political economy motives,
we have shown that governments can shift the cost of their domestic intervention onto foreign
trading partners by manipulating world prices with their unilateral tariff choices, and that this is
the source of the inefficiency which a reciprocal trade agreement must address. Arguing from
this perspective, we have offered an interpretation of GATT's principles of reciprocity and
non-discrimination as rules that work in concert to guide governments to efficient multilateral
trade agreements. While we have established circumstances under which customs unions are
compatible with an efficient multilateral trading system built on these principles, we have shown
that these circumstances are quite narrow, and that in addition free trade agreements are
fundamentally incompatible with such a system. As such, we offer support for the view that
preferential agreements pose a threat to the existing multilateral trading system.
Our basic argument is developed in four main steps. First, we establish that governments'
unilateral tariffs are higher than is efficient, because of the temptation to shift costs onto trading
partners via the world-price externality. Second, utilizing the requirement of balanced trade, we
find that the principle of reciprocity as practiced in GATT serves to neutralize the world-price
implications of tariff negotiations. Reciprocity thus enables governments to achieve efficient trade
policy outcomes. Third, we construct a multi-country model and observe that externalities then
may travel to the home government both through world and foreign local prices. When the home
government sets MFN tariffs, however, the only externality is the world-price externality, and so
the principle of reciprocity again delivers an efficient outcome. Finally, we observe that
exceptions to MFN for the purpose of creating preferential agreements revive the local-price
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externality, thus frustrating the ability of a multilateral system governed by the principle of
reciprocity to deliver an efficient outcome.
The empirical relevance of our theory requires that governments are able to shift the costs
of their intervention onto trading partners and that the implications of such cost-shifting activities
are quantitatively significant. The first requirement is met if governments are able to influence
the terms of trade with their trade policy choices, which is the case when foreign exporters incur
some of the incidence of an import tariff (i.e., when the full tariff is not passed through to
domestic consumers). It is therefore relevant to note that a large empirical literature exists that
documents imperfect pass-through of exchange-rate shocks. Presumably, if the cost increase to
foreign exporters takes the form of a tariff increase as opposed to an exchange rate shock,
imperfect pass through would once again occur, confirming that some of the incidence of the
import tariff is borne by foreign exporters. Empirical support for this presumption is offered by
Feenstra (1995).27
Evidence also exists that supports the requirement that the terms-of-trade effects of trade
policy choices influence the national cost of intervention in quantitatively important ways. In
particular, this requirement is strongly supported in the empirical studies by Goldberg (1996) and
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1994). In both studies, it is found that the terms-of-trade
implications of the U.S. decision in the 1980's to restrict automobile imports from Japan with
VER's (rather than tariffs) increased substantially the cost to the U.S. of achieving the reduced
import volumes. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes report a particularly striking experiment. They
compare the actual VER policy with a hypothetical equivalent-tariff policy and calculate that the
equivalent-tariff policy would have yielded revenue sufficient to turn what was a losing trade
policy in terms of U.S. national income into a policy that would have generated a net gain to U.S.
national income of $12.5 billion. The study is relevant for our arguments, since the only
27In this context, it is instructive also to mention the theoretical analysis of Gros (1987). He finds that even
apparently small countries have some power over the terms of trade, provided that the industry in monopolistically
competitive. We also stress that our theory does not require that all countries are able to alter the terms of trade.
Our theory suggests that truly "small" countries should be extended MEN treatment under GATT without a
requirement that they offer reciprocal liberalization of their own. (This is because the unilateral tariff policies of
small countries impart no externality; see Bagwell and Staiger, 1996.) To some extent, this treatment is represented
in GATT through the "principle supplier" rule (see Dam, 1970, p. 61).
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difference between the two policies is that they generate distinct world prices. It is precisely this
role of world prices to affect the incidence of the cost of intervention across trading partners that
is the starting point of our theory.28
We conclude by mentioning two caveats that apply to our analysis as it relates to the role
of preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system. First, we have interpreted reciprocity
and non-discrimination as principles that guide governments from inefficient unilateral outcomes
to the efficiency frontier. In practice, however, enforcement difficulties at the multilateral level
(see, e.g., Dam, 1970) may preclude governments from eliminating fully the terms-of-trade driven
restrictions in trade volume and arriving at the efficiency frontier. It then becomes possible that
the formation of preferential agreements may enhance the efficiency of the multilateral trading
system, by providing additional enforcement ability that results in multilateral tariffs that are
closer to the efficiency frontier. As we show in other work (Bagwell and Staiger, forthcoming
c), however, the enforcement implications of preferential agreements for multilateral tariff
cooperation are complex, and there is as yet no basis from which to conclude that such
agreements are necessarily efficiency enhancing.29
Second, while the government welfare function that we have employed in our analysis is
quite general, it does not capture many of the reasons that governments might pursue preferential
agreements in practice. For example, regional integration initiatives may reflect broader
objectives, such as military security and political stability, which are not captured by local and
world prices. This suggests that GATT's willingness to allow Article XXIV exceptions to MFN
may be understood in terms of the broader benefits that regional integration may confer.
28At the same time, the decision of the U.S. to "give away" such an amount might be taken as evidence that
governments in fact do not care about the terms of trade, even when the associated implications for income are large.
This inference, however, does not follow from the U.S. VER experience. The relevant policy alternative for the U.S.
was not a set of unilateral tariff increases (corresponding to the equivalent-tariff policy above), which surely would
have incited a retaliatory "trade war" with Japan, but rather a set of tariff changes from the U.S. and Japan that were
consistent with GATT rules.
29See also Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming a,b), Bond and Syropoulos (1996, forthcoming) and Bond,
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